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Abstract
The main focus of this paper is on enhancement of two types of game-theoretic learn-
ing algorithms: log-linear learning and reinforcement learning. The standard analysis of
log-linear learning needs a highly structured environment, i.e. strong assumptions about
the game from an implementation perspective. In this paper, we introduce a variant of
log-linear learning that provides asymptotic guarantees while relaxing the structural as-
sumptions to include synchronous updates and limitations in information available to the
players. On the other hand, model-free reinforcement learning is able to perform even un-
der weaker assumptions on players’ knowledge about the environment and other players’
strategies. We propose a reinforcement algorithm that uses a double-aggregation scheme
in order to deepen players’ insight about the environment and constant learning step-size
which achieves a higher convergence rate. Numerical experiments are conducted to verify
each algorithm’s robustness and performance.
1. Introduction
Most of the studies done on Multi-agent Systems (MASs) within the game theory framework
are focused on a class of games called potential games (e.g. (Rahili and Ren (2014)), (Wang
and Pavel (2014)), (Marden and Wierman (2008))). Potential games are an important
class of games that are most suitable for optimizing and modeling large-scale decentralized
systems. Both cooperative (e.g. (Li and Cassandras (2005))) and non-cooperative (e.g.
(Rahili and Ren (2014))) games have been studied in MAS. A non-cooperative potential
game is a game in which there exists competition between players, while in a cooperative
potential game players collaborate. In potential games, a relevant equilibrium solution is a
Nash equilibrium from which no player has any incentive to deviate unilaterally.
The concept of “learning” in potential games is an interesting notion by which a Nash
equilibrium can be reached. Learning schemes assume that players eventually learn about
the environment (the space in which agents operate) and also about the behavior of other
players (Kash et al. (2011)). A well-known game theoretic learning is Log-Linear Learning
(LLL), originally introduced in (Blume (1993)). LLL has received significant attention on
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issues ranging from analyzing convergence rates (e.g. (Shah and Shin (2010))) to the ne-
cessity of the structural requirements (e.g. (Alo´s-Ferrer and Netzer (2010))). The standard
analysis of LLL relies on a number of explicit assumptions (Marden and Shamma (2012)):
(1) Players’ utility functions establish a potential game. (2) Players update their strategies
one at a time, which is referred to as asynchrony. (3) A player is able to select any action
in the action set, which is referred to as completeness assumption. LLL guarantees that
only the joint action profiles that maximize the potential function are stochastically stable.
As we see in Section 2.2, the asynchrony and completeness assumptions can be relaxed
separately which, results in two different algorithms called Synchronous LLL (SLLL) and
Binary LLL (BLLL) (Marden and Shamma (2012)) respectively.
In this work we combine the advantages of both algorithms and relax the asynchrony and
completeness assumptions at the same time. We would like to emphasize that “synchronous
learning” used in (Marden and Shamma (2012)) does not necessary mean that the whole
set of agents are allowed to learn, but rather means that the learning process is carried out
by a group of agents. Although, this group can be the entire set of agents, we believe that
the phrase “partial-synchronous learning” is more accurate in reflecting what we mean by
this multi-agent learning and we use this expression in the rest of this paper.
A different type of learning, originally derived from behaviorist psychology and the no-
tion of stimulus-response, is Reinforcement Learning (RL). The main idea in RL is that
players tend to use strategies that worked well in the past. In RL, players keep an “aggre-
gate” of their past interactions with their environment to respond in future situations and
produce the most favorable outcome. Towards this direction we propose a new RL-based
algorithm whose performance is much better than conventional RL methods in potential
games. The following is an overview of our contributions:
• The work in (Marden and Shamma (2012)) studies LLL from the perspective of dis-
tributed control theory. Classical LLL has useful convergence guarantees, but makes
several assumptions that are unrealistic from the perspective of distributed control.
Namely, it is assumed that agents always act asynchronously, i.e. one at a time, and
that they always have complete access to use any of their actions. Although, (Marden
and Shamma (2012)) demonstrates that these assumptions can be relaxed separately,
we show that these relaxations can be combined, i.e. LLL can be employed without
the asynchrony assumption and without the completeness assumption, at the same
time. This, as we can see later, increases the convergence rate of the algorithm and
optimizes the exploration process. Formal convergence analysis of the proposed algo-
rithm is also presented. Note that, while in an asynchronous learning process only one
player is allowed to learn at each iteration, in a partial-synchronous process a group
of agents (including the whole set of agents) is able to take actions. However, in both
cases, all players are aware of the process common clock.
• We propose a modified Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm that can be com-
bined with LLL to build up a model-based LLL algorithm which further relaxes LLL’s
assumptions on initial knowledge of utility function. In addition to this, our modified
algorithm relaxes the basic assumption of known component number of the classical
EM, in order to make it more applicable to empirical examples. Through a numerical
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experiment, we show that by using this algorithm, both the convergence rate and the
equilibrium are improved.
• We finally propose a model-free RL algorithm which completely drops LLL’s assump-
tions on players’ knowledge about their utility function and other players’ strategies.
However, as we will see later this comes with the cost of slower convergence rate. The
proposed RL employs a double-aggregation scheme in order to deepen players’ in-
sight about the environment and uses constant learning step-size in order to achieve a
higher convergence rate. Convergence analysis of this algorithm is presented in detail.
Numerical experiments are also provided to demonstrate the proposed algorithm’s
improvements.
A short version of this work without proofs and generalization appears in (Hasanbeig and
Pavel (2017b)) and (Hasanbeig and Pavel (2017a)). This paper discusses a number of
generalizations and also proofs with necessary details.
2. Background
Let G(I,A,u) be a game where I denotes the set of players and |I|=N , A=×iAi denotes the
action space, where Ai is the finite set of actions of player i, and ui:A→R is player i’s utility
function. Player i’s (pure) action is denoted by αi∈Ai, with α−i=(α1,...,αi−1,αi+1,...,αN )
denoting action profile for players other than i. With this notation, we may write a joint
action profile α=(α1,...,αN )∈A as α=(αi,α−i)∈A.
In this paper, t is the continuous time and n is the discrete time. In a repeated version
of the game G, at each time t (or at every iteration n), each player i∈I selects an action
αi(t)∈Ai (or αi(n)∈Ai) and receives a utility ui(α) which, in general, is a function of the
joint action α. Each player i chooses action αi(t) (or αi(n)) according to the information
and observations available to player i up to t (or iteration n) with the goal of maximizing
its utility. Both the action selection process and the available information depend on the
learning process.
In a repeated game, a Best Response (BR) correspondence BR(α−i) is defined as the set
of optimal strategies for player i against the strategy profile of its opponents, i.e. BR(α−i)=
argmaxαi∈Aiui(αi,α−i) This notion is going to be used quite often in the rest of this paper.
2.1 Potential Games
The concept of a potential game, first introduced in (Monderer and Shapley (1996)), is a
useful tool to analyze equilibrium properties in games. In a potential game a change in each
player’s strategy is expressed via a player-independent function, i.e. potential function. In
other words, the potential function, specifies players’ global preference over the outcome of
their actions.
Definition 1 Potential Game: A game G is a potential game if there exists a potential
function Φ:A7→R such that for any agent i∈I, for every α−i∈A−i and any αi1,αi2∈Ai we
have Φ(αi2,α
−i)−Φ(αi1,α−i)=ui(αi2,α−i)−ui(αi1,α−i), where ui:A7→R is the player i’s utility
function (Marden and Shamma (2012)).
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From Definition 1, when player i switches its action, the change in its utility equals the
change in the potential function. This means that for all possible deviations from all action
pairs, the utility function of each agent i is aligned with the potential function. Thus, in
potential games, each player’s utility improvement is equal to the same improvement in the
potential function.
An improvement path Ω in a potential game is defined as a sequence of action profiles
Ω={α1→α2→...→αm} such that in each sequence αk→αk+1 a player i makes a change in
its action and receives a strictly higher utility, i.e. ui(αk+1)>u
i(αk). An improvement path
terminates at action profile α∗ if no further improvement can be obtained. A game G is
said to have the finite improvement property if every improvement path in G is finite.
Theorem 2 Every improvement path in a finite potential game is finite (Monderer and
Shapley (1996)).
This means that there exist a point α∗ such that no player in I can improve its utility and
the global potential function by deviating from this point. In other words
ui(αi∗,α
−i
∗ )≥ui(αi,α−i∗ ), ∀αi∈Ai, ∀i∈I. (1)
The strategy profile α∗ is called pure Nash equilibrium of the game.
Definition 3 Nash Equilibrium: Given a game G, a strategy profile α∗=(αi∗,α−i∗ ) is a
pure Nash equilibrium of G if and only if ui(αi∗,α−i∗ )≥ui(αi,α−i∗ ), ∀αi∈Ai, ∀i∈I.
At a Nash equilibrium no player has a motivation to unilaterally deviate from its current
state (Nash (1951)).
A mixed strategy for player i is defined when player i randomly chooses between its ac-
tions in Ai. Let xi
αi
be the probability that player i selects action αi∈Ai (the discrete version
is denoted by Xi
αi
). Hence, player i’s mixed strategy is xi∈X i where xi=(xi
αi1
,...,xi
αi|Ai|
) and
X i is a unit |Ai|-dimensional simplex X i={x∈R|Ai| s.t. ∑α∈Ai xα=1, xα≥0}. Likewise,
we denote the mixed-strategy profile of all players by x=(x1,...,xN )∈X where the mixed
strategy space is denoted by X=×iX i.
A mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is an N -tuple such that each player’s mixed strategy
maximizes its expected payoff if the strategies of the others are held fixed. Thus, each
player’s strategy is optimal against his opponents’. Let the expected utility of player i be
given as
ui(x)=
∑
α∈A
(
∏
s∈I
xsαs)u
i(αi,α−i), (2)
Then a mixed strategy profile x∗∈X is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if for all players
ui(xi∗,x−i∗ )≥ui(xi,x−i∗ ), ∀xi∈X i, ∀i∈I. Such a Nash equilibrium is a fixed-point of the
mixed-strategy best-response, or in other words, all players in a Nash equilibrium play their
best response xi∗∈BR(x−i∗ ), ∀i∈I where BR(x−i)={xi∗∈X i|ui(xi∗,x−i)≥ui(xi,x−i), ∀xi∈
X i}, is the best response set (Morgenstern and Von Neumann (1953)).
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2.2 Learning in Games
Learning in games tries to relax assumptions of classical game theory on players’ initial
knowledge and belief about the game. In a game with learning, instead of immediately
playing the perfect action, players adapt their strategies based on the outcomes of their
past actions. In the following, we review two classes of learning in games: (1) log-linear
learning and (2) reinforcement learning.
2.2.1 Log-Linear Learning
In Log-Linear Learning (LLL), at each time step, only “one” random player, e.g. player i,
is allowed to alter its action. According to its mixed strategy xi, player i chooses a trial
action from its “entire” action set Ai. In LLL, player i’s mixed strategy or probability of
action β∈Ai is updated by a Smooth Best Response (SBR) on ui:
xiβ=
exp(1/τ ui(β,α−i)∑
γ∈Aiexp(1/τ ui(γ,α−i)
. (3)
where τ is often called the temperature parameter that controls the smoothness of the
SBR. The greater the temperature, the closer xi is to the uniform distribution over player
i’s action space.
Note that, each player i in LLL needs to know the utility of all actions in Ai, including
those that are not played yet, and further actions of other players α−i. With these assump-
tions, LLL can be modeled as a perturbed Markov process where the unperturbed Markov
process is a best reply process.
Definition 4 Stochastically Stable State: Let Prβ be the frequency or the probability
with which action β is played in the associated perturbed Markov process, where >0 is the
perturbation index. Action β is then a stochastically stable state if: lim→0Prβ=Prβ where
Prβ is the corresponding probability in the unperturbed Markov process (Young (1993)).
Synchronous Learning:(relaxing asynchrony assumption)
One of the basic assumptions in standard LLL is that only one random player is allowed
to alter its action at each step. In (partial-) synchronous log-linear learning (SLLL) a
group of players G⊂I is selected to update its action based on the probability distribution
rp⊂∆(2I); rpG is defined as the probability that group G will be chosen and rpi is defined
as the probability that player i∈I updates its action. The set of all groups with rpG>0
is denoted by G¯. In an independent revision process, each player independently decides
whether to revise his strategy by LLL rule. SLLL is proved to converge under certain
assumptions (Marden and Shamma (2012)).
Constrained Action Set:(relaxing completeness assumption)
Standard LLL requires each player i to have access to all available actions in Ai. In the case
when player i has no free access to every action in Ai, its action set is “constrained” and
is denoted by Aic:Ai→2A
i
. With a constrained action set, players may be trapped in local
sub-optimal equilibria since the entire Ai is not available to player i at each move. Thus,
stochastically stable states may not be potential maximizers. Binary log-linear learning
(BLLL) is a variant of standard LLL which provides a solution to this issue.
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Assumption 1 For each player i and for any action pair αi(1),αi(m)∈Ai there exists
a sequence of actions αi(1) → αi(2) → ... → αi(m) satisfying αi(k)∈Aic(αi(k−1)), ∀k∈
{2,...,m}.
Assumption 2 For each player i and for any action pair αi(1),αi(2)∈Ai, αi(2)∈Aic(αi(1))
⇔ αi(1)∈Aic(αi(2)).
The following theorem studies the convergence of BLLL in potential games under Assump-
tions 1 and 2.
Theorem 5 In a finite N -player potential game satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2 and with
potential function Φ:A7→R, if all players adhere to BLLL, then the stochastically stable
states are the set of potential maximizers (Marden and Shamma (2012)).
2.2.2 Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement Learning (RL) is another variant of learning algorithms that we consider
in this paper. RL discusses how to map actions’ reward to players’ action so that the
accumulated reward is maximized. Players are not told which actions to take but instead
they have to discover which actions yield the highest reward by “exploring” the environment
(Sutton and Barto (2011)). RL only requires players to observe their own ongoing payoffs,
so they do not need to monitor their opponents’ strategies or predict payoffs of actions
that they did not play. In the following we present a technical background on RL and its
application in MASs.
Aggregation:
In RL each player uses a score variable, as a memory, to store and track past events. We
denote player i’s score vector by pi∈P i where P i is player i’s score space. It is common
to assume that the game rewards can be stochastic, i.e., an action profile does not always
result in the same deterministic utility. Therefore, actions need to be sampled, i.e. aggre-
gated, repeatedly or continuously. A common form of continuous aggregation rule is the
exponential discounted model:
piβ(t)=p
i
β(0)λ
t+
∫ t
0
λt−sui(β,α−i)ds, (β,α−i)∈A, (4)
where piβ is action β’s aggregated score and λ>0 is the model’s discount rate. λ can be
alternatively defined via T=log(1/λ). The choice of T affects the learning dynamics and the
process of finding the estimated Nash equilibrium. The discount rate has a double role in
RL: (1) It determines the weight that players give to their past observations. (2) T reflects
the rationality of the players in choosing their actions and consequently the accuracy of
players’ stationary points in being the true Nash equilibrium. Additionally, discounting
implies that the score variable piβ(t) will remain bounded which consequently prevent the
agents’ mixed strategies from approaching the boundaries X (Coucheney et al. (2014)). By
differentiating (4), and assuming piβ(0)=0, we obtain the following score dynamics
p˙iβ=u
i(β,α−i)−Tpiβ. (5)
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By applying the first-order Euler discretization on (5) we obtain:
P iβ(n+1)=P
i
β(n)+µ(n)[u
i(β,α−i)−TP iβ(n)], (6)
where n is the iteration number, µ(n) is the discretization step size and P iβ(n) is the discrete
equivalent of piβ(t). A stochastic approximation of the discrete dynamics requires diminish-
ing step sizes such that
∑
nµ(n)=∞ and
∑
nµ(n)
2<∞ (Bena¨ım (1999)).
Choice Map:
In the action selection step players decide how to exploit the score variable to choose a
strategy against the environment, e.g. according to:
SBR(pi)=arg max
xi∈X i
∑
β∈Ai
[xiβp
i
β−hi(xi)]. (7)
This choice model is often called “Smoothed Best Response (SBR) map” or “quantal re-
sponse function” where the penalty function hi in (7) has to have the following properties:
1. hi is finite except on the relative boundaries of X i,
2. hi is continuous on X i, smooth on relative interior of X i and |dhi(xi)|→+∞ as xi
approaches to the boundaries of X i,
3. hi is convex on X i and strongly convex on relative interior of X i.
The choice map (7) actually discourages player i from choosing an action from boundaries
of X i, i.e. from choosing pure strategies. The most prominent SBR map is the “logit” map
based on using Gibbs entropy in (7),
xiα=
[
SBR(pi)
]
α
=
exp(piα)∑
β∈Ai exp(p
i
β)
. (8)
It is not always easy to write a closed form of the choice map and the Gibbs entropy is an
exception (Coucheney et al. (2014)).
In order to discretize (7) we again apply first-order Euler discretization:
Xi(n+1)=SBR(P i(n)), (9)
where Xi is the discrete equivalent of xi.
At this point all the necessary background is presented and in the following we are going
to discuss our proposed learning algorithms.
3. Partial-Synchronous Binary Log-Linear Learning
In this section, we present a modified LLL algorithm in which both assumptions on asyn-
chrony and complete action set are relaxed. This means that in a Partial-Synchronous
Binary Log-Linear Learning (P-SBLLL) scheme agents can learn simultaneously while their
available action sets are constrained. This simultaneous learning presumably increases the
BLLL learning rate in the MAS problem.
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In P-SBLLL algorithm, we propose that at each time n, a set of players S(n)⊆I indepen-
dently update their actions according to each player i’s revision probability rpi:Ai→(0,1).
The revision probability rpi is the probability with which agent i wakes up to update its
action. All the other players I\S(n) must repeat their current actions.
Each player i∈S(n) selects one trial action αiT uniformly randomly from its constrained
action set Aic(αi(n)). Then, player i’s mixed strategy is
Xiαi(n)(n)=
exp(
1
τ
ui(α(n)))
exp(
1
τ
ui(α(n)))+exp(
1
τ
ui(αT ))
, (10)
XiαiT
(n)=
exp(
1
τ
ui(αT ))
exp(
1
τ
ui(α(n)))+exp(
1
τ
ui(αT ))
, (11)
where αT is the action profile for which each player i∈S(n) updates its action to αiT and all
the other players I\S(n) repeat their actions. In the following, we analyze the convergence
of the proposed algorithm.
3.1 P-SBLLL’s Convergence Analysis
From the theory of resistance trees, we use the useful relationship between stochastically
stable states and potential maximizing states. We make the following assumption:
Assumption 3 For each player i, and for each action αi, the revision probability rpi must
be bounded and 0<rpi(αi(n))<1.
Lemma 6 Under Assumption 3, P-SBLLL induces a perturbed Markov process where the
resistance of any feasible transition α1∈A→α2∈A with deviating set of players S is
R(α1→α2)=
∑
i∈S
max{ui(α1),ui(α2)}−ui(α2), (12)
where each deviating player i∈S selects its action based on Aic.
Proof: Let P, >0 denote the perturbed transition matrix. The probability of transition
from α1 to α2 is
P(α1→α2)=
∏
i∈S
rpi(αi1)
|Aic(αi1)|
∏
j∈I\S
(1−rpj(αj1))
∏
i∈S
−ui(α2)
−ui(α1)+−ui(α2)
, (13)
where :=e−1/τ . The first term
∏
i∈S
rpi(αi1)
|Aic(αi1)|
represents the probability that all the players
in S wake up to change their actions from α1 to α2. The second term
∏
j∈I\S(1−rpj(αj1))
is the probability that the players in I\S stay asleep. The last term ∏i∈S −ui(α2)−ui(α1)+−ui(α2)
8
is the binary SBR over α1 and α2. Next define the maximum utility of player i for any two
action profiles α1 and α2 as V
i(α1,α2)=max{ui(α1),ui(α2)}. By multiplying the numerator
and denominator of (13) by
∏
i∈S 
V i(α1,α2) we obtain
P(α1→α2)=∏
i∈S
rpi(αi1)
|Aic(αi1)|
∏
j∈I\S
(1−rpj(αj1))
∏
i∈S
V
i(α1,α2)−ui(α2)
V i(α1,α2)−ui(α1)+V i(α1,α2)−ui(α2)
.
(14)
Dividing (14) by 
∑
i∈SV
i(α1,α2)−ui(α2) yields
P(α1→α2)

∑
i∈SV i(α1,α2)−ui(α2)
to be
∏
i∈S
rpi(αi1)
|Aic(αi1)|
∏
j∈I\S
(1−rpj(αj1))
∏
i∈S
1
V i(α1,α2)−ui(α1)+V i(α1,α2)−ui(α2)
. (15)
According to theory of resistance trees (Young (1993)), if
0<lim
→0
P(α1→α2)

∑
i∈SV i(α1,α2)−ui(α2)
<∞
then our claim about R(α1→α2) in (12) is true. Considering the definition of V i(α1,α2), we
know that for each player i, either V i(α1,α2)−ui(α1) or V i(α1,α2)−ui(α2) is zero and the
other one is a positive real number. Thus, as →0, ∏i∈S 1V i(α1,α2)−ui(α1)+V i(α1,α2)−ui(α2)
in (15) approaches 1 and
lim
→0
P(α1→α2)

∑
i∈SV i(α1,α2)−ui(α2)
=
∏
i∈S
rpi(αi1)
|Aic(αi1)|
∏
j∈I\S
(1−rpj(αj1)). (16)
From Assumption 3,
∏
i∈S
rpi(αi1)
|Aic(αi1)|
and
∏
j∈I\S(1−rpj(αj1)) are finite positive real num-
bers. Hence, 0<lim→0
P(α1→α2)

∑
i∈Smax{ui(α1),ui(α2)}−ui(α2)
<∞. Therefore, the process is a per-
turbed Markov process where the resistance of the transition α1 to α2 is R(α1→α2)=∑
i∈Smax{ui(α1),ui(α2)}−ui(α2). 
Definition 7 Separable Utility Function: Player i’s utility function ui is called sepa-
rable if ui only depends on player i’s action αi.
Lemma 8 Consider any finite N -player potential game where all the players adhere to
P-SBLLL and the potential function is defined as Φ:A→R. Assume that players’ utility
functions are separable. For any feasible transition α1∈A→α2∈A with deviating set of
players S, the following holds:
R(α1→α2)−R(α2→α1)=Φ(α1)−Φ(α2). (17)
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Proof: From Lemma 6, R(α1→α2)=
∑
i∈S12max{ui(α1),ui(α2)}−ui(α2), and R(α2→α1)=∑
i∈S21max{ui(α2),ui(α1)}−ui(α1), where S12 is the set of deviating players during the
transition α1→α2 and S21 is the set of deviating players in the transition α2→α1. By
Assumption 2, if the transition α1→α2 is possible then there exist a reverse transition
α2→α1. Clearly, the same set of deviating players is needed for both α1→α2 and α2→α1,
i.e. S12=S21=S. Therefore:
R(α1→α2)−R(α2→α1)=[∑
i∈S12
max{ui(α1),ui(α2)}−ui(α2)
]
−
[∑
i∈S21
max{ui(α2),ui(α1)}−ui(α1)
]
=
∑
i∈S
[
max{ui(α1),ui(α2)}−ui(α2)−max{ui(α2),ui(α1)}+ui(α1)
]
.
(18)
By canceling identical terms max{ui(α2),ui(α1)}, R(α1→α2)−R(α2→α1)=
∑
i∈Su
i(α1)−
ui(α2). Since players’ utility functions are separable, for any player i, u
i(α1)−ui(α2)=
ui(αi1,α
−i
1 )−ui(αi2,α−i1 ). From Definition 1 we have ui(αi1,α−i1 )−ui(αi2,α−i1 )=Φ(αi1,α−i1 )−
Φ(αi2,α
−i
1 ) and it is easy to show that
∑
i∈Su
i(α1)−ui(α2)=Φ(α1)−Φ(α2). 
Next, we prove that in separable games, the stable states of the algorithm maximize the
potential function. In other words, the stable states are the optimal states.
Proposition 9 Consider any finite N -player potential game satisfying Assumptions 1, 2
and 3. Let the potential function be Φ:A→R and assume that all players adhere to P-
SBLLL. If the utility functions for all players are separable, then the stochastically stable
states are the set of potential maximizers.
Proof: We first show that for any path Ω, defined as a sequence of action profiles Ω:={α0→
α1→...→αm} and its reverse path ΩR:={αm→αm−1→...→α0}, the resistance difference is
R(Ω)−R(ΩR)=Φ(α0)−Φ(αm). where
R(Ω):=
m−1∑
k=0
R(αk→αk+1), R(ΩR):=
m−1∑
k=0
R(αk+1→αk). (19)
Assuming S as the set of deviating players for the edge αk→αk+1 in Ω, the expanded form of
this edge can be written as αk→αk+1={αk=αk0→αk1→αk2→...→αkq−1→αkq=αk+1}, where
αki→αki+1 is a sub-edge in which only one player is deviating and q=|S|. From Lemma 8
R(αki→αki+1)−R(αki+1→αki)=Φ(αki)−Φ(αki+1). Note that |S|=1 for each sub-edge. Con-
sequently for each edge αk→αk+1={αk=αk0→αk1→αk2→...→αkq−1→αkq=αk+1} we obtain
R(αk→αk+1)−R(αk+1→αk)=
Φ(αk0)−Φ(αk1)+Φ(αk1)−Φ(αk2)+...+Φ(αkq−1)−Φ(αkq).
By canceling the identical terms,
R(αk→αk+1)−R(αk+1→αk)=Φ(αk0)−Φ(αkq)=Φ(αk)−Φ(αk+1). (20)
Comparing (20) and (17) implies that if the utility functions of all players are separable,
the number of deviating players does not affect the resistance change between forward and
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(a) Tree T rooted at α (b) Ωp and its reverse path Ω
R
p
(c) Tree T ′ rooted at α∗
Figure 1: Resistance Trees
backward transitions. Finally, we sum up the resistance difference in (20) for all pairs
(αk,αk+1), k∈{0,1,...,m−1}:
∑m−1
k=0 R(αk→αk+1)−R(αk+1→αk)=
∑m−1
k=0 Φ(αk)−Φ(αk+1), or
equivalently
m−1∑
k=0
R(αk→αk+1)−
m−1∑
k=0
R(αk+1→αk)=
m−1∑
k=0
Φ(αk)−Φ(αk+1). (21)
From (19) we have
∑m−1
k=0 R(αk→αk+1) is the resistance over the path Ω, i.e. R(Ω) and∑m−1
k=0 R(αk+1→αk) is the resistance over the reverse path ΩR, i.e. R(ΩR). Furthermore,
it is easy to show
∑m−1
k=0 Φ(αk)−Φ(αk+1)=Φ(α0)−Φ(αm). Consequently,
R(Ω)−R(ΩR)=Φ(α0)−Φ(αm). (22)
Now assume that an action profile α is a stochastically stable state. Therefore, there exist
a tree T rooted at α (Fig. 1.a) for which the resistance is minimum among the trees rooted
at other states. We use contradiction to prove our claim. As the contradiction assumption,
suppose the action profile α does not maximize the potential and let α∗ be the action profile
that maximizes the potential function. Since T is rooted at α and from Assumption 1, there
exist a path Ωp from α∗ to α as Ωp={α∗→α1→...→α}. Consider the reverse path ΩRp from
α to α∗ (Fig. 1.b) ΩRp ={α→αm→...→α∗}. We can construct a new tree T ′ rooted at α∗ by
adding the edges of ΩRp to T and removing the edges of Ωp (Fig. 1.c). The resistance of the
new tree T ′ is R(T ′)=R(T )+R(ΩRp )−R(Ωp). By (22), R(T ′)=R(T )+Φ(α)−Φ(α∗). Recall
that we assumed Φ(α∗) is the maximum potential. Hence Φ(α)−Φ(α∗)<0 and consequently
R(T ′)<R(T ). Therefore T is not a minimum resistance tree among the trees rooted at
other states, which is in contrast with the basic assumption about the tree T . Hence, the
supposition is false and α is the potential maximizer. We can use the above analysis to
show that all action profiles with maximum potential have the same stochastic potential
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(ϕ) which means all the potential maximizers are stochastically stable. 
In the following we analyze the algorithm’s convergence for the general case of non-separable
utilities under extra assumptions.
Assumption 4 For any two player i and j, if Φ(αi2,α
−i)≥Φ(αi1,α−i) then ui(αi2,α−i)≥
uj(αi1,α
−i).
The intuition behind Assumption 4 is that the set of agents has some level of homogeneity.
Thus, if the potential function is increased by agent i changing its action from αi1 to α
i
2 it
is as if any other agent j had at most the same utility increase.
Assumption 5 The potential function Φ is non-decreasing.
Note that Assumption 5, does not require knowledge of Nash equilibrium. The intuition is
that when action profile is changed such that we move towards the Nash equilibrium, the
value of potential function will never decrease.
Theorem 10 Consider a finite potential game in which all players adhere to P-SBLLL
with independent revision probability. Let Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 hold. If an action
profile is stochastically stable then it is potential function maximizer.
Proof: From the theory of resistance trees, the state α is stochastically stable if and only
if there exists a minimum resistance tree T rooted at α (see Theorem 3.1 in (Marden and
Shamma (2012))). Recall that a minimum resistance tree rooted at α has a minimum
resistance among the trees rooted at other states. We use contradiction to prove that α
also maximizes the potential function. As the contradiction assumption, suppose the action
profile α does not maximize the potential. Let α∗ be any action profile that maximizes the
potential Φ. Since T is rooted at α, there exists a path from α∗ to α: Ω={α∗→α}. We
can construct a new tree T ′, rooted at α∗ by adding the edges of ΩR={α→α∗} to T and
removing the edges of Ω. Hence,
R(T ′)=R(T )+R(ΩR)−R(Ω). (23)
If the deviator at each edge is only one player, then the algorithm reduces to BLLL. Sup-
pose there exist an edge αq→αq+1 in ΩR with multiple deviators. The set of deviators is
denoted by S. If we show R(ΩR)−R(Ω)≤0 then T is not the minimum resistance tree and
therefore, supposition is false and α is actually the potential maximizer. Note that since
players’ utilities may not be separable, the utility of each player depends on the actions of
other players.
From Lemma 6, for any transition α1→α2 in ΩR, R(α1→α2)=
∑
i∈S12max{ui(α1),ui(α2)}−
ui(α2), and R(α2→α1)=
∑
i∈S21max{ui(α2),ui(α1)}−ui(α1), where S12 is the set of devi-
ating players during the transition α1→α2. By Assumption 2, S12=S21=S. Therefore
R(α1→α2)−R(α2→α1)=[∑
i∈S12
max{ui(α1),ui(α2)}−ui(α2)
]
−
[∑
i∈S21
max{ui(α2),ui(α1)}−ui(α1)
]
=
∑
i∈S
[
max{ui(α1),ui(α2)}−ui(α2)−max{ui(α2),ui(α1)}+ui(α1)
]
.
(24)
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By canceling identical terms max{ui(α2),ui(α1)},
R(α1→α2)−R(α2→α1)=
∑
i∈S
ui(α1)−ui(α2). (25)
Now divide α1→α2 into a sequence of sub-edges in which only one agent is deviating.
Assuming S={i,i+1,i+2,...,i+|S|} as the set of deviating players for this transition, the
expanded from of this edge can be written as
α1→α2={α1=αk0→(αi2,α−i1 )=αk1→αk2→...→αkq−1→αkq=α2},
where αkj→αkj+1 is a sub-edge in which only player i+jth is deviating. Note that q=|S|.
We can rewrite (25) as
R(α1→α2)−R(α2→α1)=
∑
i∈S
ui(α)−ui(αk1)+ui(αk1)−ui+1(αk2)+
ui+1(αk2)−...+ui+|S|−1(αkq−1)−ui(α).
(26)
By Assumption 5 and by knowing that α1→α2 is in ΩR={α→α∗}: Φ(α1)=Φ(αk0)≤Φ(αk1)≤
Φ(αk2)≤...≤Φ(αkq)=Φ(α2). Thus, by Assumption 4: ui(α)−ui(αk1)≤0,ui(αk1)−ui+1(αk2)≤
0,...,ui+|S|−1(αkq−1)−ui(α)≤0.
This means that R(α1→α2)−R(α2→α1)≤0. Since α1→α2 is an arbitrary transition in
ΩR and α2→α1 is its reverse transition in Ω, it is obvious that R(ΩR)−R(Ω)≤0. Therefore,
from (23), T is not a minimum resistance tree among the trees rooted at other states, which
is in contrast with the basic assumption about T . Hence, the supposition is false and α is
the potential maximizer. 
3.2 Model-based P-SBLLL
Note that in P-SBLLL’s (10) and (11), player i needs to know the utility value of any action
β∈Ai. However, in the case of unknown environment, utility values of actions in Ai that
are not played are not available to player i.
In a model-based learning algorithm, we assume that players can eventually form a
belief of the environment by constantly interacting with the environment. This belief is
called model. By using the model, when the environment is unknown, players are able to
estimate the payoff of the actions that they did not play. In a model-based learning, each
player i possesses an unbiased and bounded estimate uˆiα for the payoff of each action α∈Ai
(including the actions that he did not play) such that E[uˆiα(n+1)|Hn]=uiα(n), where Hn is
the history of the process up to the iteration n. Thus, in a model-based LLL scheme, utility
values of unknown actions is replaced by player’s estimation model.
The model is usually a function that is fitted over the utility values of the actions that are
already sampled. Therefore, one of the main assumptions in model-based learning is that
players know the structure of the utility function so that they can fit a function accordingly.
We conclude this section by emphasizing that P-SBLLL is a type of learning algorithm
in which each agent’s action set is constrained (recall the completeness assumption). Fur-
thermore, unlike BLLL in which only one random agent takes a trial action, all the agents
are allowed to explore the environment. Another valuable feature of P-SBLLL is that each
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agent’s exploration process can be precisely regulated by the revision probability. Thus,
each agent can decide independently, and not randomly, whether it is the time for taking
a trial action or it is better to remain on the current state. More interestingly, the revi-
sion probability can be conditioned on each agent’s situation. This will certainly reduce
redundant explorations in P-SBLLL comparing to BLLL.
Despite the above-mentioned improvements, P-SBLLL still relies on an estimation model
of the environment. This means that players in P-SBLLL have a prior knowledge about
the structure of the utility distribution so they can apply an appropriate model on the
environment. In practice, this may not be an appropriate assumption. In order to relax
this assumption, we turn to RL algorithms which do not require a model of the environment.
4. Second Order Q-learning
Q-learning, as a sub-class of RL algorithms, is widely used for policy synthesis problems.
In Q-learning algorithm the actions’ expected utilities can be compared without requiring a
knowledge of the utility function. Thus, in situations where the utility structure is unknown
and a model-based LLL can not be used, we may use Q-learning. Furthermore, Q-learning
can be used in processes with stochastic transitions, without requiring any adaptations.
Recall that RL dynamics typically uses first-order aggregation where actions’ payoff is
used to determine the growth rate of the players’ score variable p˙iβ=u
i(β,α−i)−Tpiβ. We
now discuss what happens beyond first-order, when using payoffs as higher-order forces of
change. To that end we first introduce the notion of strictly dominated strategy and weakly
dominated strategy:
Definition 11 A strategy α∈Ai is strictly (weakly) dominated by strategy β∈Ai if for all
x−i∈X−i we have ui(α,x−i)<u(β,x−i) (ui(α,x−i)≤u(β,x−i)).
For a pure strategy β∈Ai, extinction means that xiβ→0 as t→∞. Alternatively, a mixed
strategy qi∈X i becomes extinct along x(t) if Dkl(qi||xi)=
∑
βq
i
βlog(q
i
β/x
i
β)→∞ as t→∞.
The evolution of the system’s dynamic and the efficiency of players’ learning cru-
cially depend on how players aggregate their past observation and update their score vari-
able. With this in mind we discuss an n-fold, i.e. high-order, aggregation scheme in RL:
piβ
(n)
(t)=ui(β,α−i) where piβ
(n)
denotes nth-order derivative. Needless to say, an nth-order
aggregation scheme looks deeper into the past observations. Theorem 4.1 in (Laraki and
Mertikopoulos (2013)) proves that in a high-order continuous-time learning, dominated
strategies become extinct. Furthermore, Theorem 4.3 in (Laraki and Mertikopoulos (2013))
shows that unlike the first-order dynamics in which weakly dominated strategies may sur-
vive, in high-order dynamics (n≥2) weakly dominated strategies become extinct.
In this section we propose a discrete-time Q-learning algorithm in which we incorpo-
rated a second-order reinforcement in the aggregation step. Such high-order reinforcement
provides more momentum towards the strategies that tend to perform better. We call this
algorithm Second-Order Q-Learning (SOQL).
Recall that in a RL algorithm, the score variable characterizes the relative utility of
a particular action. In the Q-learning algorithm, the score variable is represented by the
Q-value. The Q-value corresponding to the selected action will be updated by the generated
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reinforcement signal once that action is performed. In standard Q-learning, the update rule
for Q-value is
Qiβ(n+1)=Q
i
β(n)+µ(n) [u
i
β(n)−Qiβ(n)],
where uiβ(n)=1{αi(n)=β} u
i(n) and ui(n) is the player i’s realized utility at time step n,
Qiβ(n) is the player i’s Q-value corresponding to action β, and µ(n) is the step size assumed
to be diminishing. In the action selection step, each player selects his action according to a
Q-value based SBR:
Xiβ(n+1)=
exp(1/τQiβ(n))∑
β′∈Aiexp(1/τQ
i
β′(n))
. (27)
In SOQL we propose a double aggregation process for updating Q-value. Furthermore,
to increase SOQL’s convergence rate we also propose to use an update rule with constant
step size µ:
P iβ(n+1)=P
i
β(n)+µ [u
i
β(n)−P iβ(n)],
Qiβ(n+1)=Q
i
β(n)+µ [P
i
β(n)−Qiβ(n)],
(28)
For its mixed strategy, player i uses a greedy action selection similar to (Wang and Pavel
(2014)):
Xi(n+1)=(1−ϑ)Xi(n)+ϑBRi(Qi(n)), (29)
where the constant coefficient ϑ is the action selection step size satisfying ϑ<µ<1 and
player i’s best-response correspondence BRi(Qi(n)) is defined as BRi(Qi(n))={ei
αi∗
| αi∗∈
Ai, Qi
αi∗
(n)=maxα∈Ai Qiα(n)} where eiαi∗ is player i’s pure strategy or the unit vector cor-
responding to αi∗.
4.1 SOQL’s Convergence Analysis
In the following we give conditions under which our proposed Q-learning algorithm converges
to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium almost surely.
Proposition 12 If an action profile α(n)=(β,α−i) is repeatedly played for m>0 iterations,
i.e. α(n+c)=α(n) for all 1≤c<m, then:
P iβ(n+m)=(1−µ)mP iβ(n)+(1−(1−µ)m)uiβ(n), (30)
and
Qiβ(n+m)=m(1−µ)m−1Qiβ(n+1)−(m−1)(1−µ)mQiβ(n)
+
[
(m−1)(1−µ)m−m(1−µ)m−1+1] uiβ(n). (31)
Proof: From recursively using (28) it is easy to show that (30) and (31) hold. 
Corollary 13 For sufficiently large m if 0<µ<1 we have limm→∞ Qiβ(n+m)=u
i
β(n).
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Proof: Corollary 13 can be easily verified by taking the limitm→∞ in (31), i.e. limm→∞m(1−
µ)m−1=0, limm→∞(m−1)(1−µ)m=0, limm→∞(m−1)(1−µ)m−m(1−µ)m−1+1=1. 
Proposition 14 Let α∗=(β∗,α−i∗ ) be the action profile that is played at time step n and
n+1 where eiβ∗=BR
i(Qi(n)). We show that if 0<µ<1 then at any following mth iteration,
with the probability of at least
∏m
c=1
(
1−(1−ϑ)c)N ,
Qiβ∗(n+m+1)=(m+1)(1−µ)mQiβ∗(n+1)−(m)(1−µ)m+1Qiβ∗(n)
+
[
m(1−µ)m+1−(m+1)(1−µ)m+1] uiβ∗(n), (32)
and
Xi(n+m+1)=(1−ϑ)m+1 Xi(n)+(1−(1−ϑ)m+1)eiβ∗ . (33)
Proof: Since β∗ is BRi(Qi(n)) and also in Q-learning, Q-values are iteratively converging
to uiβ∗ , for every player i∈I and for every action β∈Ai, β 6=β∗ we have Qiβ∗(n+1)>Qiβ∗(n)>
Qiβ(n) and u
i
β∗(n+1)=u
i
β∗(n)>Q
i
β(n). We use induction to prove our claim. For m=1 since
Qiβ∗(n+1)>Q
i
β(n)=Q
i
β(n) it follows that at time step n+2, α∗ is still the estimated best
response. By (29) and considering the fact that BRi(Qi(n))=eiβ∗ then at time n+2 we
have Xi(n+2)=(1−ϑ)Xi(n+1)+ϑeiβ∗ . Since eiβ∗ is a unit vector, Xiβ∗(t)>ϑ and it is true
for all other players. Therefore, at time step n+2, the action profile α∗ is played with the
probability of at least ϑN . From the assumption that for player i, uiβ∗(n)>Q
i
β∗(n), we have:
µ2uiβ∗(n)>µ
2Qiβ∗(n). (34)
Now, consider the condition Qiβ∗(n+1)>Q
i
β∗(n). For 0<µ<1 it is easy to show that
2(1−µ)Qiβ∗(n+1)>2(1−µ)Qiβ∗(n). (35)
By combining (34) and (35)
2(1−µ)Qiβ∗(n+1)+µ2uiβ∗(n)>2(1−µ)Qiβ∗(n)+µ2Qiβ∗(n).
By subtracting (1−µ)2Qiβ∗(n) from the both sides,
2(1−µ)Qiβ∗(n+1)+µ2uiβ∗(n)−(1−µ)2Qiβ∗(n)>
2(1−µ)Qiβ∗(n)+µ2Qiβ∗(n)−(1−µ)2Qiβ∗(n).
(36)
From (31), 2(1−µ)Qiβ∗(n+1)+µ2uiβ∗(n)−(1−µ)2Qiβ∗(n) is equivalent toQiβ∗(n+2) and there-
fore:
Qiβ∗(n+2)>Q
i
β∗(n)>Q
i
β(n) (37)
Recall that other actions β∈Ai are not played during the m iterations, i.e. Qiβ(n)=Qiβ(n+
1)=Qiβ(n+2). By substituting Q
i
β(n) with Q
i
β(n+2) in (37) we get Q
i
β∗(n+2)>Q
i
β(n+2)
which means that β∗ is still the estimated best response for player i at iteration n+2. By
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repeating the argument above for all players we show that at time step n+2, α∗ remains
the estimated best response and the claim in (32) follows for m=1.
Now assume, at every iteration c where 1≤c≤m−1, a∗ is played with probability
∏m−1
c=1
(
1−
(1−ϑ)c)N . At time step m, Xi is updated as:
Xi(n+m+1)=(1−ϑ)m+1 Xi(n)+(1−(1−ϑ)m+1)eiβ∗ . (38)
By Proposition 12,
Qiβ∗(n+m+1)=(m+1)(1−µ)mQiβ∗(n+1)−(m)(1−µ)m+1Qiβ∗(n)
+
[
m(1−µ)m+1−(m+1)(1−µ)m+1] uiβ∗(n), (39)
Since for player i any action β 6=β∗ is not played, it follows that Qiβ(n+m+1)=Qiβ(n).
Moreover, Qiβ∗(n+m+1)>Q
i
β∗(n+m)>Q
i
β(n+m) and u
i
β∗(n+m+1)>Q
i
β(n+m). From (38),
at time step n+m+2, α∗ with probability of at least
(
1−(1−ϑ)n)N and from Proposition
12,
Qiβ(n+m+2)=2(1−µ)Qiβ(n+m+1)−(1−µ)2Qiβ(n+m)+µ2uiβ(n+m). (40)
With the same argument as for n=1, Qiβ∗(n+m+2)>Q
i
β(n+m+2). Therefore, the estimated
best response for player i is not changed. In other words BRi(Qi(n+m+2))=BRi(Qi(n))=
eiβ∗ . By substituting (38) into (29) we get X
i(n+m+2)=(1−ϑ)m+2Xi(t)+(1−(1−ϑ)m+2)eiβ∗ ,
which completes the induction argument.

Corollary 15 If for sufficiently large m>0 the conditions of Proposition 14 hold, then for
every player i the following holds with probability
∏∞
c=1[
(
1−(1−ϑ)c)N :
lim
m→∞ Q
i
β∗(n+m)=u
i(α∗), lim
m→∞ X
i(n+m)=eiβ∗ . (41)
Theorem 16 For sufficiently large m, if the conditions in Proposition 14 hold, then X(n+
m) converges to a neighborhood of α∗ with probability one.
Proof: From Proposition 14 we know that α∗ is played with probability
∏∞
c=1[
(
1−(1−
ϑ)c
)N
. Inspired by Proposition 6.1 in Chasparis et al. (2011), we show that this probability
is strictly positive. The product
∏∞
c=1(1−(1−ϑ)c) is non-zero if and only if
∑∞
c=1log(1−(1−
ϑ)c)>−∞. Alternatively we can show
−
∞∑
c=1
log(1−(1−ϑ)c)<∞. (42)
By using the limit comparison test and knowing 0<1−ϑ<1:
lim
c→∞
−log(1−(1−ϑ)c)
(1−ϑ)c = limc→∞
1
1−(1−ϑ)c)=1.
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Therefore, (42) holds if and only if
∑∞
c=1 (1−ϑ)c<∞. The latter holds since
∞∑
c=1
(1−ϑ)c= 1
1−(1−ϑ)=
1
ϑ
< ∞.
By (42) we have limm→∞
∏m
c=1(1−(1−ϑ)m)>0, so we can conclude that ∀η, 0<η<1, ∃M s.t. (1−
(1−ϑ)m)≥η ∀m≥M. In other words after M iterations X(n+M) enters a ball B1−η(α∗)
with probability
∏M
c=1(1−(1−ϑ)c)N . As discussed in Wang and Pavel (2014), and following
the proof of Theorem 3.1 in Marden et al. (2009), for M≥log1−ϑ(1−η)>0, trajectories of
X(n+M) enters a neighborhood of α∗ with probability
∏∞
c=1(1−(1−ϑ)c)N ; hence, converges
to α∗ almost surely.

4.1.1 Perturbation
We proved that the SOQL converges to a neighborhood of α∗, i.e. B1−η(α∗), almost surely.
Recall that in a learning algorithm it is essential that the action space is well explored;
otherwise, it is likely that the estimated equilibrium does not converge to the true Nash
equilibrium. Thus, the action selection procedure should allow players to explore new ac-
tions even if the new actions are sub-optimal. In this section we discuss the conditions under
which the estimated equilibrium can reach an actual Nash equilibrium. The perturbation
functions are usually carefully designed to suit this need. A perfect perturbation function
is decoupled from dynamics of the learning algorithm, adjustable and has minimum effect
on perturbing the optimal solution (Wang and Pavel (2014)).
In the standard Q-learning scheme, the Boltzmann action selection map has already
incorporated the exploration feature by using the temperature parameter τ (Leslie and
Collins (2005)). In order to implement such exploration feature in the modified algorithm,
we use a perturbation function. The perturbed mixed strategy for player i is defined as
X˜ij=(1−ρi(Xi,ξ))Xij+ρi(Xi,ξ) 1ij/|Ai|. (43)
where ρi(Xi,ξ) is the perturbation function. The perturbation function ρi:X i×[¯,1]→[0,1]
is a continuously differentiable function where for some ξ∈(0,1) sufficiently close to one, ρi
satisfies the following properties:
• ρi(Xi,ξ)=0, ∀Xi such that ∀ξ≥¯: |Xi|∞<ζ,
• lim|Xi|∞→1 ρi(Xi,ξ)=ξ,
• lim|Xi|∞→1 ∂ρ
i(Xi,ξ)
∂Xij
|ξ=0=0, ∀j∈Ai.
As in (43), each player i selects a random action with a small probability ρi and selects the
action with highest Q value with the probability (1−ρi).
Assumption 6 Step sizes in Q update rule are adjusted based on µij(n)=(1−X˜ij(n)).
Assumption 7 When all the players enter the perturbation zone, i.e. |Xi|∞>ζ, ∀i∈I, no
more than one player chooses a sub-optimal action at each iteration (asynchronous pertur-
bation).
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Theorem 17 If the conditions in Proposition 14 hold for a sufficiently large m, then un-
der Assumption 6 and Assumption 7, the estimated equilibrium α∗ converges to a Nash
equilibrium almost surely.
Proof: From Corollary 15 we have limm→∞ Qiβ∗(n+m)=u
i(α∗), and
lim
m→∞ X
i(n+m)=eiβ∗ ,
where α∗=(β∗,α−i∗ ). Assume that perturbation becomes active at some large time step n¯+1
and player i chooses an action β 6=β∗. From (43) we know that such perturbation happens
with the probability of at least ξ/|Ai|. From (28) and Assumption 6, player i updates its
action by
Qiβ(n¯+2)=2X¯
i
β(n¯)Q
i
β(n¯+1)−X¯iβ(n¯)2Qiβ(n¯)+(1−X¯iβ(n¯))2ui(β(n¯),α−i∗ (n¯)). (44)
Consider the following two cases:
• ui(β,α−i∗ (n¯))<ui(α∗(n¯)): In this case player i failed to improve the utility and will
stay at the estimated equilibrium α∗ almost surely.
• ui(β,α−i∗ (n¯))=ui(α∗(n¯)): With X¯iβ sufficiently close to zero the Q-values for the actions
β is updated to a value sufficiently close to ui(β,α−i∗ (n¯))=ui(α∗(n¯)). Hence, in the
worst case, when α∗(n¯) is only played once, the Q-values for the actions β and β∗ may
become equal. Therefore, in the action selection stage, the set of best response may
contain two pure actions. Consequently, the mixed strategies for both actions β and
β∗ is updated by (29) and player i chooses one of them randomly in the next time
step.
• ui(β,α−i∗ (n¯))>ui(α∗(n¯)): In this case player i found a response that is better than
α∗. Since the action β has small probability X¯iβ, i.e., sufficiently close to 0, then
(1−X¯iβ) is sufficiently close to 1. Thus from (44), Qiβ is updated to a value sufficiently
close to ui(β,α−i∗ (n¯)) and the action profile (β,α−i∗ (n¯)) becomes the new estimated
best response, i.e., α∗(n¯+1):=(β,α−i∗ (n¯)). Note that player’s utility is improved by
ui(α∗(n¯+1))−ui(α∗(n¯)), and the potential would also increase by the same amount.
Recall that from the finite improvement property, such improvement in potential
function is not limitless and will terminate at the potential maximum, i.e. Nash
equilibrium in potential games. Hence, the estimated equilibrium α∗ will eventually
converge to an actual Nash equilibrium. 
In the following, through a number of numerical experiments, we compare the performances
of P-SBLLL and SOQL with those of BLLL and standard QL.
5. Case Study
Multi-robot Coverage Control (MCC) algorithms are concerned with the design of rules for
coordinating a set of robots’ action. The main objective of agents in MCC is to efficiently
cover an area. We assume that there is a set of hidden targets in the area and the robots
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are assumed to find them. Targets are distributed randomly in the area and each target
emits a signal in a form of a symmetric Gaussian function which can be sensed by nearby
robots. The area is a limited, two-dimensional, rectangular plane over which a probabilistic
function is defined that represents the probability of targets’ existence (e.g. (Rahili and
Ren (2014)), (Li and Cassandras (2005)) and (Guestrin et al. (2005))). Therefore, the
probability of targets’ existence at each point is proportional to the cumulative strength
of the signals detected at that point. However, there exist different approaches in the
literature to model the search area. One approach is to model the environment as a two-
dimensional polyhedron over which an event density function is defined to determine targets’
distribution (e.g. (Li and Cassandras (2005))). Alternatively, the area can be divided into
Voronoi regions where the objective of agents in this approach is to converge to the centroids
of their assigned regions (e.g. (Cortes et al. (2002)), (Cortes et al. (2005)) and (Kwok and
Martinez (2010))).
During the search for the targets, the mobile sensors regularly collect data from the
environment by sensing the signal strength at different locations. The robots use the col-
lected data to “reinforce” their knowledge about the area or to “model” the environment.
This knowledge will further support agents’ decision-making process. Clearly, the overall
systems’ performance is directly related to agents’ location in the environment. Thus, the
coverage control problem can be reduced to the problem of optimally locating the robots
based on data collected from the area. In the following we present the formulation of our
MCC setup.
5.1 Problem Formulation
Consider a finite number of robots (i.e. agents) as a network of mobile sensors scattered in
a geographic area. The area is a two-dimensional plane, divided into a L×L square grid.
Each cell on this grid is a 1×1 square and the coordinates of its center are l=(lx,ly)∈L,
where L is defined as the collection of the centroids of all lattices. The robots can only
move between these centroids.
The location of agent i∈I at iteration n is αi(n):=(lix(n),liy(n)) ∈L and this defines his
action at time step n. Let the set of robot i’s neighbor cells be defined as N iR(α(n)):={l∈
L| |αi(n)−l|≤R} where R is the neighborhood radius. The motion of agents is limited to
their adjacent lattices and we use Aic(n) to denote this constrained action set for agent i at
time step n.
A number of targets that are distributed in the area (Fig. 2.a). Each target emits a
signal in the form of symmetric Gaussian function. Therefore, the signal distribution on
the area is basically a Gaussian mixture model. The location of the targets is initially
unknown for the robots. Thus, the worth of each cell is defined as the probability that a
target exists at the center of that cell and is denoted by f : L→[0,1]. By sensing targets’
signal, the agents can determine f(l) when they are at the coordinate l. Since there is a
direct correlation between the strength of the sensed signal and the worth value at a given
cell, the worth distribution is also a Gaussian mixture model (Fig. 2.b). The area covered
by agent i at time step n is Ci:Ai 7→R and is defined as Ci(αi(n)):=∑l∈N iδ(n)f(l) where δ
is the covering range.
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(a) Two dimensional environment and the
set of targets
(b) Worth distribution as a Gaussian mix-
ture model
Figure 2: The set of targets and their associated worth distribution
In our setup, each agent i lays a flag at each cell as he observes that cell; the trace of
his flags is denoted by Υ i and is detectable by other agents from the maximum distance of
2δ. This technique allows the agents to have access to the observed areas locally without
any need to have access to each other’s observation vectors.
5.1.1 Game Formulation
An appropriate utility function has to be defined to specify the game’s objective and to
properly model the interactions between the agents. In our case, we have to define a
utility function that takes the reward of sensing worthwhile areas. Inspired by (Rahili and
Ren (2014)), we also consider the cost of movement of the robots: the movement energy
consumption of agent i from time step n−1 to n is denoted by Eimove=Ki(|αi(n)−αi(n−1)|),
where Ki>0 is a regulating coefficient. The coverage problem can now be formulated as a
game by defining the utility function:
ui(αi(n),αi(n−1))=%i[Ci(αi(n))−Cin(αi(n))]−Ki(|αi(n)−αi(n−1)|), (45)
where Cin(α
i(n))=
∑
j∈I\i
∑
l∈Nδj ∩Nδi f(l) and %
i is defined as:
%i=
{
1 :αi /∈Υ j ,j 6=i
0 :otherwise
Parameter %i prevents players to pick their next actions from the areas that are previously
observed by other agents. As in (45), Ci(αi(n))−Cin(αi(n)) is the worth of area that is only
covered by agent i. Hence, ui only depends on the actions of player i, i.e. ui is “separable”
from the actions of other players.
Lemma 18 The coverage game G:=〈I,A,Ucov〉 is a potential game where Ucov is the col-
lection of all utilities Ucov={ui,i=1,...,N} and the potential function is Φ(α(n),α(n−1))=∑N
j=1u
j(αj(n),αj(n−1)).
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Proof: We have to show that there exists a potential function Φ:A7→R such that for any
agent i∈I, every α−i(n)∈A−i and any αi1(n),αi2(n)∈Ai:
Φ(αi2(n),α
−i(n),α(n−1))−Φ(αi1(n),α−i(n),α(n−1))=
ui(αi2(n),α
−i(n),α(n−1))−ui(αi1(n),α−i(n),α(n−1)),
(46)
Using Φ as in Lemma 18 we have:
Φ(αi2(n),α
−i(n),α(n−1))=[ΣNj=1,j 6=iuj(αj(n),αj(n−1))]+ui(αi2(n),αi(n−1))=[
ΣNj=1,j 6=i%
j [Cj(αj(n))−Cjn(αj(n))]−ΣNj=1,j 6=i[Ki(|αj(n)−αj(n−1)|)]
]
+[
%i[Ci(αi2(n))−Cin(αi2(n))]−Ki(|αi2(n)−αi(n−1)|)
]
,
and
Φ(αi1(n),α
−i(n),α(n−1))=[ΣNj=1,j 6=iuj(αj(n),αj(n−1))]+ui(αi1(n),αi(n−1))=[
ΣNj=1,j 6=i%
j [Cj(αj(n))−Cjn(αj(n))]−ΣNj=1,j 6=i[Ki(|αj(n)−αj(n−1)|)]
]
+[
%i[Ci(αi1(n))−Cin(αi1(n))]−Ki(|αi1(n)−αi(n−1)|)
]
,
Hence,
Φ(αi2(n),α
−i(n),α(n−1))−Φ(αi1(n),α−i(n),α(n−1))=
%i[Ci(αi2(n))−Cin(αi2(n))]−Ki(|αi2(n)−αi(n−1)|)−%i[Ci(αi1(n))−Cin(αi1(n))]−
Ki(|αi1(n)−αi(n−1)|)=ui(αi2(n),α−i(n),α(n−1))−ui(αi1(n),α−i(n),α(n−1)),
and (46) follows. 
5.1.2 Gaussian Model
Targets are assumed to emit a signal in a Gaussian form that decays proportionally to
the distance from the target; the mobile sensor should be close enough to sense the signal.
Thus, the function f(l) is basically a worth distribution in the form of Gaussian Mixture
over the environment. A Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) is a weighted sum of Gaussian
components (i.e. single Gaussian functions), i.e. GMM :=f(l)=
∑M
j=1ωj g(l|µj ,Σj), where
M is the number of components (i.e., targets), ωj is the weight (signal strength) of jth
component and g(l|µj ,Σj)= 1
2pi|Σj |1/2
exp[
−1
2
(l−µj)TΣ−1j (l−µj)] is a two-variable Gaus-
sian function where l is the location vector; µj is the mean vector (i.e. location of the target
j); and Σj is the covariance matrix of component j. Note that each component represents
one target’s presence probability and the whole GMM is a mixture of these components.
To ensure that the Gaussian distribution is representing the probability map over the area,
the summation of all weight coefficients must be equal to one (i.e.
∑M
j=1ωj=1). GMM
parameters can be summarized into the set λ:={ωj ,µj ,σj |j=1,...,M}.
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5.2 Learning Process
Recall that a learning scheme can efficiently reach a Nash equilibrium in a potential game
based on the game’s finite improvement property. This section discusses P-SBLLL and
SOQL as learning schemes to solve the MCC problem. We first review P-SBLLL and then
we present SOQL’s results.
5.2.1 P-SBLLL
A 40×40 square area with 1×1 lattices has been considered as the environment. The
Gaussian distribution in this area has been chosen randomly with different but reasonable
weight, mean and covariance values (Fig.2). The number of targets (Gaussian components)
is between 1 to 5 and robots have no prior knowledge about this number.
A group of five robots (N=5) are initialized randomly through this GMM to maximize
their utility function. We assumed that a robot in our MCC setup is not able to move rapidly
from its current lattice to any arbitrary lattice. In other words, the range of its movement
is bounded, i.e., constrained. Recall that the P-SBLLL scheme is a modified version of
standard LLL which allows players to have a constrained action set in a potential game.
Furthermore, we showed that in a potential game, the game will stochastically converge to
the potential maximizer if players adhere to P-SBLLL.
However, in P-SBLLL each agent must have a posteriori knowledge about the utility dis-
tribution, i.e. GMM , to be able to calculate their future utility function ui(αiT ,α
−i(n),α(n))
in (10) and (11). Hence, in the case of unknown environment, it is not possible to use P-
SBLLL scheme, unless we replace ui(αiT ,α
−i(n),α(n)) with an estimation from the model
uˆi(αiT ,α
−i(n),α(n)). This raises the need for an environmental model in the P-SBLLL al-
gorithm.
Unknown Utility Model :
It is common in practice to assume that the game being played is unknown to the agents,
i.e. agents do not have any prior information about the utility function and do not know
the expected reward that will result from playing a certain action (Nowe´ et al. (2012)). It
is because the environment may be difficult to assess, and the utility distribution may not
be completely known. In the following, inspired by (Rahili and Ren (2014)) we introduce
an estimation which can provide a model of the environment in model-based learning.
Expectation Maximization:
Assume the environment is a GMM . Agent i’s estimation of the mixture parameters
λ:={ωj ,µj ,σj |j=1,...,M} is denoted by λˆi={ωˆij ,µˆij ,σˆij |j=1,...,M}. The estimation model is
ĜMM :=fˆ(l)=
∑M
j=1ωˆj g(l|µˆj ,Σˆj). During the searching task, the robots will keep their
observations of sensed regions in their memories. Let agent i’s observation vector at it-
eration n be a sequence of its sensed values from time step 1 to n and is denoted by
Oi={Oi1,Oi2,Oi3,...,Oin} where Oin is defined as the corresponding coordinates of the sensed
lattice by agent i at time step n. Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm is an algorithm
that is used in the literature to find maximum likelihood parameters of a statistical model
when there are missing data points from the model. The EM algorithm can estimate the
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GMM parameters λˆ through an iterative algorithm (Dempster et al. (1977)):
ωˆij=
1
n
n∑
τ=1
P i(j|Oiτ ,λˆi),
µˆij=
∑n
τ=1P
i(j|Oiτ ,λˆi)Oiτ∑n
τ=1P
i(j|Oiτ ,λˆi)
,
σˆij
2=
∑n
τ=1P
i(j|Oiτ ,λˆi)(Oiτ−µˆij)(Oiτ−µˆij)T∑n
τ=1P
i(j|Oiτ ,λˆi)
,
P i(j|Oiτ ,λˆi)=
ωˆij g(O
i
τ |µˆij ,σˆij)∑M
k=1ωˆ
i
k g(O
i
τ |µˆik,σˆik)
,
(47)
where P i(j|Oiτ ,λˆi) is often referred to as posteriori probability of the observation vector
Oiτ of agent i for the jth component of Gaussian distribution. Through (47), given the
current estimated parameters, the EM algorithm estimates the likelihood that each data
point belongs to each component. Next, the algorithm maximizes the likelihood to find new
parameters of the distribution.
Recall that Oi is the sequence of agent i’s observed coordinates within the area. Thus,
(47) only considers the coordinates of the observed lattice l and disregards its corresponding
signal strength f(l). This issue is pointed out in (Rahili and Ren (2014)) and the proposed
solution as introduced in (Lakshmanan and Kain (2010)) is to repeat the iterative algorithm
for m times in worthwhile areas and m is chosen as:
m=
 1+V round(
f(l)
fmode
) :f(l)≥fmode
1 :f(l)<fmode
where f(l) is the worth at coordinate of l, fmode is the threshold above which the signal is
considered worthwhile for EM repetition and V is the correction factor which regulates the
number of algorithm repetitions for the worthy lattices. The algorithm will run once for
areas with a worth value of less than the threshold.
The variation rate of the estimation parameters λˆi is relatively low due to the rate of
update of the observation vector and the nature of the EM algorithm. The case of slow vari-
ation of Gaussian distribution is investigated in (Lim and Shamma (2013)). With assuming
a slow changing distribution, (Lim and Shamma (2013)) showed that the agents’ estima-
tion error |λˆ(n)−λ(n)| is decreased by extending the observations vector; consequently, the
agents will stochastically converge to a Nash equilibrium. If we assume that the number
of the targets (M) is a known parameter, we can use the iterative algorithm discussed in
this section. However, we assumed the agents do not have any prior knowledge about the
environment. This lack of knowledge includes the probability distribution function and also
the number of targets. Thus, the standard EM algorithm can not be used.
5.2.2 EM with Split and Merge
In this section, we present a new modified EM algorithm that does not need the number of
components to calculate GMM ’s parameters. To achieve this goal, we propose to have a
mechanism that can estimate the number of the targets in parallel to parameters estimation.
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The Akaike information criterion (AIC) introduced in (Akaike (1974)) is considered as
the main verification method to help agents select the best estimation for the number of
the targets. The Akaike information criterion is a measure of the relative quality of a
distribution model for a set of data points. Given a set of models for the same data, AIC
estimates the quality of each model, relative to other statistical models. The AIC value of
each model is AIC=2k−2ln(L) where L is the maximized value of the likelihood and k is the
number of estimated parameters in the model. Given a collection of statistical models, the
one with minimum AIC value is the best model (Akaike (1974)). Akaike criterion considers
the goodness of the fit as the likelihood function L and penalty of complexity of the model
as k (i.e. the number of model parameters).
Let the estimated number of the targets at time step n each robot i be denoted by Mˆ i(n).
In our proposed algorithm, after each nAIC time steps, each agent i∈I randomly picks a
number TAIC from the set M(nAIC)={Mˆ i(nAIC)+1,Mˆ i(nAIC)−1}⊂N. If Mˆ i(nAIC)−1=
0 then M(nAIC) reduces to {Mˆ i(nAIC)+1}. Next, player i decides between its current
estimated Gaussian component number Mˆ i(nAIC) and TAIC according to the following
probabilities:
P i
Mˆi(nAIC)
=
exp(
1
τ
IAIC(Mˆ i(nAIC)))
exp(
1
τ
IAIC(Mˆ i(nAIC)))+exp(
1
τ
IAIC(TAIC))
, (48)
P iTAIC=
exp(
1
τ
IAIC(TAIC))
exp(
1
τ
IAIC(Mˆ i(nAIC)))+exp(
1
τ
IAIC(TAIC))
, (49)
where P i
Mˆ i(nAIC)
is the probability that player i keeps its current estimation Mˆ i(nAIC) and
P iTAIC is the probability that player i chooses TAIC as its estimation of the number of the
components. IAIC(Mˆ i(nAIC)) is the inverse AIC value for agent i’s estimation distribution
when agent i’s estimated number of the components is Mˆ i(nAIC) and IAIC(TAIC) is the
inverse AIC value when agent i’s estimation is TAIC .
Since the number of the components are changing every nAIC iterations, the next step is
to determine an appropriate method for merging and splitting Gaussian components. The
method proposed in (Ueda et al. (2000)) incorporates the split and merge operations into
the EM algorithm for Gaussian mixture estimations. Moreover, efficient criteria have been
proposed in (Ueda et al. (2000)) to decide which components should be merged or split.
Despite the fact that the number of Gaussian components are changing over time the shape
of estimation distribution is not changed significantly since the set of data points is not
increasing so fast. In the following the merge and split algorithms are briefly discussed:
Merge:
In order to reduce the number of components in a Gaussian distribution, some of the com-
ponents should be merged together. However, an effective criterion is needed to pick the
optimal pairs to merge.
a) Criterion: The posteriori probability of a data point gives a good estimation about which
Gaussian component that data point belongs. If for many data points, the posteriori prob-
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abilities are almost equal for two different components, it can be perceived that the compo-
nents are mergeable. To mathematically implement this, the following criterion for jth and
j′th Gaussian components is proposed in (Ueda et al. (2000)) Jmerge(j,j′;λˆ)=Pj(λˆ)TPj′(λˆ)
where Pj(λˆ)=(P (j|O1,λˆ),P (j|O2,λˆ),...,P (j|Ot,λˆ))T is a N -dimensional vector consisting
of posteriori probabilities of all data points for jth Gaussian component. The criterion
Jmerge(j,j
′;λˆ) must be calculated for all possible pairs and the pair with the largest value
is a candidate for the merge.
b) Merging Procedure: In order to merge two Gaussian components, the distribution model
parameters must be re-estimated. A modified EM algorithm is proposed in (Ueda et al.
(2000)) that re-estimates Gaussian parameters based on the former distribution parameters
(λˆ). If the merged Gaussian from the pair of j and j′ is denoted by j′′ then the initial param-
eters for the modified EM algorithm is ω0j′′=ωj+ωj′ , µ
0
j′′=
ωjµj+ωj′µj′
ωj+ωj′
, Σ0j′′=
ωjΣj+ωj′Σj′
ωj+ωj′
.
The initial parameter values calculated by the latter are often poor. Hence, the newly gener-
ated Gaussians should be first processed by fixing the other Gaussians through the modified
EM. An EM iterative algorithm then run to re-estimate the distribution parameters. The
main steps are the same as (47) except the posteriori probability:
P (j′′|Oτ ,λˆ)=
ωˆj′′ g(Oτ |µˆj′′ ,σˆj′′)
∑
k=j,j′P (k|Oτ ,λˆ)∑
k=j′′ωˆk g(Oτ |µˆk,σˆk)
. (50)
By using this modified EM algorithm, the parameters of j′′th Gaussian are re-estimated
without affecting the other Gaussian components. In our study, the merging algorithm
could be repeated for several times if more than one merge step was needed.
Split:
In case of a need to increase the number of components in the estimation distribution, we
use the split algorithm to split one or more Gaussians. As for the merging process, an
appropriate criterion is necessary.
a) Criterion: As the split criterion of kth component, the local Kullback-Leibler divergence
is proposed in (Ueda et al. (2000)): Jsplit(k;λˆ)=
∫
pk(x,λˆ)log(
pk(x,λˆ)
g(x|µˆk,Σˆk)
) dx, where pk(x,λˆ)
is the local data density around kth component and is defined as
pk(x,λˆ)=
∑t
n=1 δ(x−xn)P (k|xn,λˆ)∑t
n=1P (k|xn,λˆ)
. The split criterion Jsplit(k,λˆ), which represents the distance between two Gaussian com-
ponents, must be applied over all candidates and the one with the largest value will be
selected.
b) Splitting Procedure: A modified EM algorithm is proposed in (Ueda et al. (2000)) to
re-estimate the Gaussian parameters. If the split candidate is the kth Gaussian component
and the two resulting Gaussians are denoted by j′ and k′ the initial conditions are calculated
as follows:
ω0j′=ω
0
k′=
1
2
ωk, Σ
0
j′=Σ
0
k′=det(Σk)
1/d Id, (51)
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(a) The logic behind the revision probability (b) Revision probability func-
tion
Figure 3: Revision Probability
where Id is the d-dimensional unit matrix and d is the dimension of Gaussian function
g(x|µk,Σk). The mean vectors µ0j′ and µ0k′ are determined by applying random perturbation
vector m, m=1,2 on µk as µ0j′=µk+1 and µ
0
k′=µk+2 where ||m||||µk|| and 1 6=2. The
parameters re-estimation for j′ and k′ can be done by a modified EM algorithm similar to
the merge EM algorithm where the modified posteriori probability is
P (m′|Oτ ,λˆ)= ωˆm
′ g(Oτ |µˆm′,σˆm′)
∑
l=kP (l|Oτ ,λˆ)∑
l=j′,k′ωˆl g(Oτ |µˆl,σˆl)
, (52)
where m′=j′,k′. The parameters of j′ and k′ are re-estimated without affecting other Gaus-
sians. Splitting algorithm will be repeated if more than one split was necessary according
to the Akaike criterion. By means of AIC and split-merge technique, the agents are able
to estimate the number of targets and estimate the GMM without knowing the number of
agents.
Revision Probability:
Recall that the revision probability rpi in P-SBLLL is the probability with which agent i
wakes up to update its action. We considered a two variable function for the revision prob-
ability of each agent. The corresponding probability of each player’s revision probability
depends on the player’s action, i.e. player’s location in our MCC example. Each player i
can determine the outcome of his action as the signal strength f i(l) of his location αi=l.
Furthermore, we assume that each agent can sense a local gradient of the worth denoted
by gi(l). At each iteration, f i(l) and gi(l) are normalized based on the player’s maximum
observed f i(l) and gi(l). For each agent i, let F i and Gi be the normalized versions of f i(l)
and gi(l) respectively.
We desire a revision probability function (rpi(F i,Gi)) for which the probability that
players wake up depends on each player’s situation.We consider three situations which a
robot can fall in (Fig.3.a):
• Situation p1 where player’s received signal and gradient is almost zero: In such situ-
ation, player has to wake up to update its action, i.e. explore, and to move toward
worthwhile areas. Let a1 be the probability that player in p1 wakes to update its
action.
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• Situation p2 where player’s received signal and gradient is relatively high: In this
situation, player has entered a worthwhile region. Since the player already entered a
worthwhile area, the need for exploration reduces comparing to the player in p1, i.e.,
a2<a1 where a2 is the probability that player in p2 wakes up.
• Situation p3 where player’s received signal is relatively high but the gradient is almost
zero: This situation happens when player reaches a high local value. Clearly, player
in p3 has to remain on its position, i.e. remain asleep. Hence, a3<a2<a1 where a3 is
the probability that player in p3 wakes up.
To match with the shape of Gaussian function, we prefer to have an exponential drop as
player i’s normalized signal strength F i increases. Hence, when Gi=0, the form of revision
probability function is as follow:
rpi(F i,Gi=0)=e−k(F
i−c),
where k is the drop rate and c:=
ln(a1)
k
. For the sake of simplicity, we consider a linear
change in revision probability function as G increases. As G reaches 1, the value of the
revision probability function must be equal to a2. Therefore, for a constant F , the slope
of the line from G=0 to G=1 is a2−e−k(F i−c). Furthermore, y-intercept for this line is
e−k(F i−c). Thus the complete function is of the form
rpi(F i,Gi)=(a2−e−k(F i−c))G+e−k(F i−c). (53)
As in Fig. 3.b, the function behavior is linear versus G and exponential versus F . With
this independent revision, each player decides based on its status whether it is a good time
to wake up or not. We believe it is more efficient than a random selection as in BLLL.
Furthermore, it reduces the need for unnecessary trial and errors.
Simulation Results:
Assume that all agents adhere to P-SBLLL and Assumptions 2 and 3 hold for the MCC
problem. Players’ utility function is separable and from Proposition 9, we know that the
stochastically stable states are the set of potential maximizers. The simulation parameters
are chosen as Ki=3×10−5 for i=1,...,N , δ=1.5, Rcom=56, a1=1, a2=0.5 and a3=0.1.
The worth of covered area using P-SBLLL and BLLL is shown in Fig. 5. Clearly, the
covered worth is higher and the convergence rate is faster in P-SBLLL. Comparing to BLLL,
in P-SBLLL each player autonomously decides, based on its situation, to update its action
while in BLLL only one random player is allowed to do the trial and error. The algorithms
ran for 10 times with different initial conditions and for each algorithm Fig. 5 presents a
bound and a mean for the coverage worth. The final configuration of the agents are shown
in Fig. 6. We can see that in P-SBLLL the agents found all the targets. Although three
agents have the targets in their sensing range, the two other agents tried to optimize their
configuration with respect to the signal distribution to maximize the coverage worth.
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set n=1
for each robot i∈I do
initialize αi(1)∈L randomly
while the covered worth
∑
i∈IC
i(αi) is not in a steady state do
if TAIC is a sub-multiple of n then
process merge or split
for each robot i∈I do
determine rpi (see (53))
robot i wakes up with probability rpi
(let S(n) be the set of robots that are awake at n)
for each robot i∈S(n) do
robot i chooses a trial action αiT randomly from Aic
calculate Xi
αi(n)
and Xi
αiT
by using both GMM and ĜMM (see (10) and (11))
αi(n+1)←αi(n) with probability Xi
αi(n)
or
αi(n+1)←αiT with probability XiαiT
if αi(n+1) is αiT then
add αi(n+1) to Oi
run EM and update ĜMM
for each robot j∈I\S(n) do
αj(n+1)←αj(n)
n←n+1
Figure 4: P-SBLLL’s pseudo code
Figure 5: The real-time worth of the covered area
5.2.3 SOQL
In SOQL, the robots sample the environment at each time to create a memory of the payoff
of the actions that they played. When the environment is explored enough, this memory
can help the robots to find the game’s global optimum.
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Figure 6: Final configuration of agents in (a) BLLL and (b) P-SBLLL
set n=1
for each robot i∈I do
initialize αi(1)∈L randomly
initialize Qi(0) and Qi(1)∈R|L|
initialize Xi∈R|L|
while the covered worth
∑
i∈IC
i(αi) is not in a steady state do
for each player i∈I do
perform an action αi(n)=βi from Aic based on Xi(n)
receive ui(n)
uiβ(n)←1{αi(n)=β} ui(n)
Qiβ(n+1)←2(1−µi)Qiβ(n)−(1−µi)2Qiβ(n−1)+µi2uiβ(n)
for each β′∈Ai,β′ 6=β do
Qiβ′(n+1)←Qiβ′(n)
Xi(n+1)←(1−ϑ)Xi(n)+ϑBRi(Qi(n))
n←n+1
Figure 7: SOQL’s pseudo code
Figure 8: The real-time worth of the covered area
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Figure 9: Final configuration of agents in (a) standard Q-learning and (b) SOQL
Figure 10: The real-time worth of the covered area
The simulation parameters are chosen as Ki=3×10−5 for i=1,...,N , δ=1.5, µ=0.97,
ϑ=0.5, ζ=0.9999 and ξ=0.01. The worth of covered area by all robots, using SOQL and
first-order Q-learning, is shown in Fig. 8. It can be seen that the convergence rate is lower
for the SOQL algorithm comparing to the first-order algorithm. However, the covered worth
is higher comparing to the first-order case. The algorithms ran for 5 times with different
initial conditions and for each algorithm Fig. 8 presents a bound and a mean for the
coverage worth.
Fig. 9 shows the final configuration of the robots in standard QL and SOQL. It can be
seen that the robots that used SOQL as their learning algorithm, successfully found all the
targets. However, with the same initial locations the robots who used standard QL could
not find all the targets.
6. Conclusion
By relaxing both asynchrony and completeness assumptions P-SBLLL in Section 3 enhanced
the way the group of agents interact with their environment. We showed that comparing
to BLLL, P-SBLLL’s performance is excellent in a model-based learning scheme. A higher
convergence rate in P-SBLLL, as it was expected, is because players learn in parallel. Fur-
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thermore, because of this simultaneous learning in P-SBLLL, agents can widely explore
the environment. Another valuable feature of P-SBLLL is that each agent’s exploration is
dependent on the agent’s situation in the environment. Thus, each agent can autonomously
decide whether it is a good time for exploration or it is better to remain on its current state.
This will certainly reduce redundant explorations in P-SBLLL comparing to BLLL.
In Section 4 we proposed SOQL, a second-order reinforcement to increase RL’s aggre-
gation depth. Comparing to the model-based P-SBLLL and BLLL, the convergence rate of
SOQL is lower (Fig.10) due to the need for a wide exploration in an RL scheme. However,
in SOQL algorithm, the equilibrium worth is the same as P-SBLLL’s equilibrium worth,
and can be employed when the utility distribution is not a GMM or more generally, when
the utility structure is unknown.
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